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Abstract
Despite growing interest in the effect of political-institutional factors on the
economy, causally identified evidence on the reaction of financial markets to elec-
toral outcomes is still relatively scarce, due to the difficulty of isolating causal ef-
fects. This paper fills this gap: we estimate the ‘local average treatment effect’ of
left-wing (as opposed to conservative) electoral victories on share prices, exchange
rates, and sovereign bond yields and spreads. Using a new dataset of worldwide
national (parliamentary and presidential) elections in the post-WWII period, we
obtain a sample of 954 elections in which main parties/candidates can be classified
on the left-right scale based on existing sources and monthly financial data are avail-
able. To achieve causal identification, we employ a dynamic regression-discontinuity
design, thus focusing on close elections. We find that left-wing electoral victories
cause significant and substantial short-term decreases in stock market valuations
and in the US dollar value of the domestic currency, while the response of sovereign
bond markets is muted. Effects at longer time horizons (6 to 12 months) are very
dispersed, signaling large heterogeneity in medium-run outcomes. Stock market
and exchange rate effects are stronger and more persistent in elections in which the
Left’s proposed economic policy is more radical, in developing economies, and in
the post-1990 period.
1 Introduction
Many interpreted the stock market rally which followed the 2016 US Presidential election
as a ‘Trump boom’ or, less optimistically, a ‘Trump bubble’ (Gandel, 2017; Krugman,
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2017; Schiller, 2018). Although Donald Trump’s presidency is widely thought to display
highly idiosyncratic features, the ‘Trump Boom’ is far from being the only or the most
dramatic example of a substantial financial markets’ movement attributed to a political
event. For instance, large stock market crashes followed the close victories of Franc¸ois
Mitterrand in France in 1981 (Sachs and Wyplosz, 1986) and, even more dramatically,
Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970 (Girardi and Bowles, 2018). Figure 1 illustrates these
and some other examples.
Yet, well-identified evidence on the effect of electoral outcomes on financial markets
is still scarce and limited to a small number of case studies,1 reflecting the difficulty of
achieving credible causal identification in the presence of simultaneous causality and an-
ticipation effects. Simultaneous causality arises from the strong influence that economic
factors exert on political developments (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). Anticipation
results from the fact that political changes are often largely predictable, typically on the
basis of surveys of voting intentions and expectations, especially when there is a large
margin between the competing parties or candidates.
This paper estimates the ‘local average treatment effect’ of left-wing, as opposed to
conservative, electoral victories on share prices, exchange rates and government bond
yields in a large sample of elections. We combine a new dataset on national (par-
liamentary and presidential) elections in the post-WWII period with historical daily
and monthly financial data. Our sample includes 954 elections in which main par-
ties/candidates can be classified as either (center-)left or conservative, and data is avail-
able for at least one of our financial variables of interest.
To identify causal effects, we employ a regression-discontinuity design (Hahn et al.,
2001; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Thistlewaite and Campbell, 1960). Intuitively, we
compare elections closely won and closely lost by the Left. In presidential elections, the
running variable in our RD design is the margin of victory/loss of the (center-)left’s
candidate; in parliamentary elections, it is the share of parliamentary seats won by
(center-)left parties minus 50%. We test whether the expected values of our financial
1See Girardi and Bowles (2018) on Chile’s 1970 presidential election (and subsequent coup); Herron
(2000) on the 1992 UK parliamentary election; Knight (2006) on the 2000 US presidential election;
Snowberg et al. (2007) on the 2004 US Presidential election; Wagner et al. (2017) on the November 2016
‘Trump shock’. See Section 2 for a discussion.
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outcomes of interest display a discontinuity at the cutoff which determines electoral vic-
tory. Identification is thus based on a ‘smoothness’ assumption, meaning that elections
won by a close margin should tend to be quite similar in all respects, except for the
color of the winning party/coalition. We implement our RD design through a dynamic
specification, to uncover the dynamics of the impacts around our events of interest.
Figure 2 illustrates the identification challenges associated with estimating the effect
of electoral outcomes, and our approach to address them. It plots simple averages of
financial dynamics around left-wing electoral victories, relative to electoral losses, in all
elections (left panel) and in close elections (right panel). A ‘naive’ approach that treats
all electoral outcomes as exogenous and unanticipated would lead to the conclusion that
financial markets react very little to electoral outcomes. To the contrary, prima facie
evidence from close electoral outcomes, which are likely to constitute news and be in-
dependent of macroeconomic conditions, points to substantial reactions of stock and
currency (but not government bond) markets.
Using our dynamic regression-discontinuity specification, we confirm that left-wing
electoral victories cause substantial short-term decreases in stock market valuations and
the US dollar value of the domestic currency, while the response of sovereign bond mar-
kets is muted (baseline results are summarized in Figure 5). On average, a close Left
victory causes real share prices to decrease by 5 to 6 percentage points in the short run
(7 to 9 points in a presidential election). The fall is concentrated in the first trading day
after the election, in which share prices tend to fall by 2 to 3 percentage points (3 to 5
points in presidential elections). The short-run negative effect on the US dollar value of
the domestic currency amounts to around 7 percentage points.
Effects at longer time-horizons (6 to 12 months) are very dispersed, signaling large
variability in medium-run outcomes across different experiences. With that caveat in
mind, on average across all elections we observe (at least partial) reversal of these neg-
ative effects, which may indicate ‘overreaction’ to electoral shocks.
Analyzing heterogeneity, we find that stock market and currency effects are stronger
and more persistent in elections in which the Left’s proposed economic policy is more
radical, in developing countries, and in the post-1990 period. We find no discernible
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effect on government bond yields and spreads at any time-horizon in any of these sub-
samples.
The size of our estimates represents a lower bound for the size of the underlying
effects of interest because of anticipation effects. Under the reasonable assumption that
in the close elections that we use for identification the ex-ante probability of a left-wing
victory perceived by investors is, on average, around 50%, the full underlying effects are
roughly twice as large as our estimates.
Our results are confirmed by a number of robustness and falsification tests. We em-
ploy alternative criteria for selecting the bandwidth size in our regression-discontinuity
specification. We perform falsification tests using placebo thresholds and placebo elec-
tion dates. We also test whether our results are driven by a limited number of influential
observations, and find that this is not the case.
This paper is the first to provide causally identified evidence on the reaction of fi-
nancial markets to partisan political shocks from a large sample of national elections.
Going beyond single case studies of US elections, on which existing works have mostly
focused (e.g. Snowberg et al., 2007; Knight, 2006; Wagner et al., 2017), we contribute
more general evidence to the literature on the effect of electoral outcomes. Our research
design can be seen as a generalization of case studies which have exploited close elections
to study financial market effects, like Girardi and Bowles (2018) on the ‘Allende shocks’
and Wagner et al. (2017) on the ‘Trump shock’.
The evidence we provide is informative on several theoretical issues in macroeco-
nomics and political economy. Our results are inconsistent with the ‘policy convergence
theorem’ (Downs, 1957; Hotelling, 1929), according to which different political coali-
tions would converge, under competitive pressure, to the same position dictated by the
preferences of the median voter.2 To the contrary, our results are consistent with models
in which different parties pursue different macroeconomic policy goals (Alesina, 1987;
Hibbs, 1986).
Perhaps most importantly, our results speak to the relation between capitalism and
democracy. The reaction of capital holders to changes in the political context has been
2A recent influential work that provides evidence of policy differentiation is Lee et al. (2004).
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seen by several authors as a major constraint limiting the range of policy options that
are feasible in a capitalist economy (Bowles and Gintis, 1986, pp. 88-89; Przeworski
and Wallerstein, 1988; CORE Team, 2017, Unit 22). Although this paper is silent on
whether policy platforms are influenced by the expected reaction of financial markets,
we do provide empirical backing for the idea that capital holders react substantially to
political variation.
The paper is structured as follows. After discussing the previous literature and how
we contribute to it (Section 2), we present our dataset (Section 3) and our research
design (Section 4). Section 5 presents main results, while in 6 we perform a number
of robustness and falsification tests. A discussion of results (Section 7) follows, before
conclusions (Section 8).
2 Previous literature on political partisanship and finan-
cial markets
Our paper contributes to a recent literature on the effect of electoral outcomes on fi-
nancial markets. Despite growing interest in the effect of political-institutional factors
on economic outcomes, causally identified evidence on this topic is still relatively scarce
and limited to few case studies.3
Some studies have provided interesting aggregate evidence from US and OECD elec-
tions, but without an explicit identification strategy to deal with anticipation effects
and endogeneity of electoral outcomes, which are therefore likely to affect their results.
Specifically, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) find that in the US, overall, Democratic
presidencies are associated with higher returns, but daily post-election returns are not
correlated with election outcomes. Sattler (2013), using a simple event-study approach,
shows that in a sample of post-1950 elections in OECD countries, stock returns tend to
be lower by 1.7 percentage points after a Left victory.
Two recent articles have used close and unexpected electoral outcomes as case stud-
3We are referring here to works that assess partisanship effects. A larger literature has studied
the effect of political connections on firms’ share prices (e.g. Ferguson and Voth, 2008; Fisman, 2001;
Jayachandran, 2006). Dube et al. (2011) estimate the effect of top-secret CIA coup authorizations on
the share prices of exposed US firms.
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ies. Girardi and Bowles (2018) focus on the victory of socialist candidate Allende in the
1970 Presidential election in Chile, an episode characterized by remarkably large policy
divergence between the competing candidates. Using both daily aggregate data and a
new firm-level dataset, they show that Allende’s election caused average share prices
to fall by as much as one half, with little firm- and sector-level heterogeneity. Wagner
et al. (2017) estimate the effect of Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential election
on the cross-section of stock returns. They find that high-tax and domestically focused
firms gained value relative to other firms, and that more easily assessed consequences
were priced faster than more complex ones.
Other case studies have dealt with anticipation effects by looking at changes in the
perceived probability of victory of parties/candidates during the election campaign. For
example Herron (2000) studies the 1992 UK parliamentary election, finding a negative
correlation between the odds of a Labor victory and average share prices, and inferring
that a Labor victory would have reduced stock valuations by 5 to 10 percent. Knight
(2006) uncovers a correlation between different types of stocks and the probability of
a Bush (as opposed to Gore) victory during the 2000 US presidential campaign. The
crucial identification assumption (and main potential limitation) of these studies is that
changes in perceived probabilities are assumed to be exogenous to economic conditions.
This identification assumption can fail under retrospective economic voting: investors
would react to changes in economic conditions by updating their vote expectations,
making perceived probabilities endogenous (Snowberg et al., 2007, pp. 824-825).4
The study of the 2004 US Presidential election by Snowberg et al. (ibid.) belongs to
this latter strand, as it focuses on changes in the perceived probability of a Republican
(vs. a Democratic) victory. However, it sidesteps the limitations of previous studies by
using higher-frequency financial and prediction markets data, and exploiting exogenous
changes in expectations due to the release of flawed exit pool data. They find that
investors associated a G.W. Bush presidency with higher stock market valuations and
4The article by Knight (2006) is arguably less likely to suffer from simultaneity bias, given its focus on
cross-sectional variation in returns (some firms and sectors outperforming others), not aggregate effects.
However, as noted by Snowberg et al. (2007, p. 809), also in that setting the assumption that changes
in the probability of victory of a candidate are exogenous to economic factors may be questionable, due
to potential unobservable factors affecting both election prospects and firms’ share prices.
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interest rates, as well as a higher price of oil and a stronger dollar. In a less precisely
identified but more general exercise, they use prediction markets to obtain a measure
of the ‘surprise’ associated with election results (dummy for Republican victory minus
ex-ante probability of Republican victory) in all US Presidential elections from 1880 to
2004. They find a positive correlation between this indicator and post-election daily
returns on the S&P100 index, indicating that a Republican victory tends to raise stock
market valuations by 3-4 percent.
While a recent literature has used regression discontinuity to identify the effect of
electoral outcomes on various policy variables at the local (municipal and regional) level
(Beland, 2015; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008), this paper is,
to the best of our knowledge, the first to employ a regression-discontinuity design to
study financial market effects at the national level. Our research design can be seen as
a generalization of case studies which have exploited close elections to study financial
market effects, like Girardi and Bowles (2018) on the ‘Allende shocks’ and Wagner et al.
(2017) on the ‘Trump shock’.
3 Data and descriptive evidence
We combine a new dataset on national (parliamentary and presidential) elections in the
1945-2018 period with historical daily and monthly data on stock prices, exchange rates
and sovereign bond yields. The resulting sample includes 954 elections in which main
parties/candidates can be classified on the left-right scale and data is available for at
least one of our financial variables of interest.
3.1 Election results and partisanship
We build a new dataset of worldwide national general (parliamentary and presidential)
elections in the post-WWII period. We collect information on election results and the
ideological stance of parties and candidates on the left-right scale from a variety of
sources. The resulting dataset includes 1,079 elections for which we are able to define the
running variable to be used in our RD design, the (Center-)Left’s margin of victory/loss.
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Parliamentary elections For parliamentary elections, our main source is the Mani-
festo Project Database (Volkens et al., 2017),5 which covers 715 parliamentary elections
in 56 countries in the 1945-2015 period. The MPD provides data on the parliamentary
seats won by all parties, their ideological classification and quantitative measures of their
policy positions on several issues.
We use MPD data to calculate the share of seats won by Left and Center-Left par-
ties, which we use as the running variable for parliamentary elections in our RD design
(Sec. 4.1). We include in the (center-)left block parties classified by MPD as either
‘Socialist’, ‘Communist’, ‘Social-Democratic’ or ‘Ecologist’. We will also use the MPD
policy positions estimates to distinguish between centrist ‘third-way’ left parties and
socialist/social-democratic parties in our analysis of heterogeneous effects (Sec. 5.3).
We use the ideological coding provided by the Party Government Dataset (Wold-
endorp et al., 2011), the Comparative Political Parties Dataset (Swank, 2013) and the
Database of Political Institutions (Cruz et al., 2016) to create a dummy variable for
whether the government formed after a parliamentary election is led by the Left.6 We
will use this measure to test the validity of the running variable employed in parlia-
mentary elections, by assessing whether there is a discontinuity in the probability of a
Left-led government at the 50% cutoff (Sec. 4.1, Figure 3).
Presidential elections Data on presidential elections is less readily available; we have
assembled an original dataset which draws from a variety of sources. Election results
(names of candidates, party affiliation and share of votes received) were collected from
publicly available national and international sources, for all elections in the 1945-2018
period for which it was possible to find information. In elections determined by an elec-
toral college system (e.g. US), we use electoral college vote shares instead of popular
vote shares. We do not, however, include cases in which electoral college votes are ex-
pressed by the parliament (e.g. Bolivian elections in which no candidate achieves 50%
of the popular vote).
We code presidential candidates as (center-)left or conservative based on existing
5Specifically, we use the 2017b version of the MPD, the latest available at the time of writing.
6For elections covered by all these three sources (or by any two of them), we define a government as
left-wing only if all the available sources code it as such.
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sources. For the Latin American elections covered by Baker and Greene (2011), we
follow their classification on the left-right scale. For other elections, when the candidate
is affiliated with a party that belongs to some worldwide association of political parties,
we assign it the ideology of the association (left-wing for ‘Socialist International’, ‘Pro-
gressive Alliance’ and ‘Foro de Sao Paulo’; conservative for the ‘International Democrat
Union’ , the ‘Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe’, ‘European People’s
Party ’). When this does not apply, whenever Lansford (2014) provides a clear indication
of the position of a candidate (or his/her party) on the left-right scale, we follow that
indication. Finally, in cases for which Lansford (ibid.) does not discuss ideology, we use
other existing national and international publicly available sources (published books and
scholarly articles) to classify the main candidates on the left-right scale whenever possi-
ble. Our dataset reports the source of the classification for each of the three most-voted
candidates in each election.
Overall sample of elections We exclude presidential elections in parliamentary sys-
tems, in which by definition the president does not have substantial executive power
(e.g. Austria). When a parliamentary and a presidential election occur in the same
month under a presidential system (for example in USA or Chile), we include only the
presidential election. The classification of the political system applying to each elec-
tion (parliamentary, assembly-elected president, presidential) is taken from Cruz et al.
(2016), Bormann and Golder (2013), Woldendorp et al. (2011) and Lindberg (2006).
The resulting dataset includes 2,487 elections from 227 countries; of these 1,614 are
parliamentary and 873 are presidential elections.7 For 1,079 of these elections (423 pres-
idential and 656 parliamentary), we are able to classify the main parties/candidates as
either (center-)left or conservative based on existing international and national sources
following the procedure outlined above, and therefore to build our running variable, the
margin of victory/loss of the Left. For 954 of these elections (621 parliamentary and
333 presidential), data on at least one of our financial outcomes of interest is available.
7As explained, this count does not include presidential elections under parliamentary systems, nor
parliamentary elections which take place in the same month of a presidential election under a presiden-
tial system. Counting also those, the total number of elections in our dataset is 2,874 (929 of which
presidential, 1,945 parliamentary).
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Descriptive statistics for these elections, which are the ones that we use in estimation,
are presented in Table 1(a). The list of countries in the sample and the number of (par-
liamentary and presidential) elections that we could use in estimation for each country
is provided in Appendix A.
3.2 Share prices, exchange rates, sovereign bond yields
We build a dataset of historical monthly data on stock market prices, exchange rates
and sovereign bond yields. For stock price indexes, we are also able to build a daily
dataset covering a substantial number of elections in our sample, in addition to the
monthly one. Our main sources are Global Financial Data (GFD) for stock prices and
bond yields, and Reinhart (2016) for exchange rates. All observations in the monthly
dataset are monthly averages.
As a measure of average share prices, we take the broadest available stock market
index for each country, resorting to other national and international sources for coun-
tries/periods not covered by GFD data. Appendix A indicates the stock market index
considered for each country, and the source from which we obtained it (when not GFD).
We deflate monthly stock market indexes with the Consumer Price Index.8
The US dollar value of the domestic currency (our measure of exchange rates) is
taken from the monthly dataset of Reinhart (ibid.). For observations that are miss-
ing in the latter, but available in the Bank of International Settlement exchange rates
database, we use the latter.9
Data on 10-years government bond yields comes from the GFD database. We use
both deflated and nominal yields, and we calculate (real and nominal) spreads relative
to US government bonds.
To identify country-years with fixed/pegged exchange rates, which therefore cannot
be used in estimating exchange rate effects, we use the monthly exchange rate regimes
classification provided by Ilzetzki et al. (2017). For country-years for which the latter is
8GFD provides deflated monthly stock market indexes using CPI data. For cases in which we resort
to other sources, we use CPI data from OECD statistics.
9BIS exchange data were downloaded from https://www.bis.org/statistics/xrusd.htm in April
2018. Reinhart (2016) and BIS data provide identical series for all the country-years that are available
in both sources.
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not available, we use the yearly classification provided by Klein and Shambaugh (2010).
Table 1(b) provides descriptive statistics for our financial outcomes of interest.
3.3 Descriptive evidence: average financial dynamics around (close
and non-close) Left electoral victories
Figure 2 plots the average dynamics of our financial outcomes of interest around Left
electoral victories, relative to Left electoral losses.10 This descriptive evidence illustrates
the challenges associated with estimating the effects of electoral outcomes, and how our
identification strategy deals with them. Figures on the left include all elections, while
figures on the right include only close elections, defined as elections in which the margin
of victory/loss of the Left is not greater than 5%.
The graphs using all elections display little or no reaction of financial markets to
electoral outcomes, leading a researcher using a ‘naive’ approach to find little sign of
any effect. The graphs using only close electoral outcomes, which are likely to be largely
unanticipated and independent of economic conditions, suggest, to the contrary, negative
effects on stock and currency markets, while confirming the indication of no effect on
Government bond spreads. In the remainder of this paper we build on this intuition
and estimate these effects using a dynamic regression-discontinuity approach, broadly
confirming the indications of this simple exercise.11
4 Regression discontinuity design
To identify the average causal effect of left-wing (as opposed to conservative) electoral
victories in our sample, we employ a regression-discontinuity design (Hahn et al., 2001;
Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Thistlewaite and Campbell, 1960). We implement our RD
design through a dynamic specification, to uncover the dynamics of the effects around
10Consistent with our RD design, here we consider a parliamentary election as won by the Left if
(center-)left parties win at least 50% of parliamentary seats. Of course a presidential election is won by
the left if the (center-)left candidate is elected president.
11RD estimates, however, will point to larger exchange rate effects than suggested by the descriptive
evidence in Figure 2. Intuitively, the main difference between this exercise and our RD estimations
is that here we take unconditional averages and give the same weight to all elections, while the RD
estimations will condition on the running variable and give higher weight to elections that are closer
to the cutoff. Moreover, in Figure 2 the threshold for inclusion in the sample of close elections (5%) is
arbitrary, while the RD estimations will employ optimal bandwidth-selection criteria from the literature.
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our events of interest.
Our regression-discontinuity approach achieves causal identification by focusing on
close elections. We exploit the threshold that determines victory in presidential elec-
tions and control of Parliament in legislative elections. Essentially, we test whether the
expected value of our outcomes of interest displays a significant ‘jump’ at this cutoff.
Given our RD strategy, our main identifying assumption is ‘smoothness’: unob-
served confounding factors do not display a discontinuity around the threshold. Under
this assumption, our RD estimator is able to isolate causal effects – including anticipated
effects – and avoid selection bias. Besides being able to identify anticipation effects, the
focus on close election is likely to substantially reduce them, as long as close elections
are less likely to be largely anticipated than elections won by a large margin.
Our RD approach does have limitations. If investors are able to anticipate with
almost certainty close electoral victories, we would find little post-election effects also
in the presence of substantial sensitivity to electoral outcomes. If they expect a large
Left victory with very high probability, and the result is a close Left victory, they may
take this as a surprise in favor of conservative parties if a close victory provides less
power than a large one.12 While perfect anticipation of close electoral outcomes seems
unrealistic, this second case, although unlikely to happen on average, is likely to occur
in some instances. Two things, however, should be noted. First, also in these cases
our RD approach would be able to identify pre-election (anticipated) effects. Second,
even confining attention to post-election effects, reassuringly these cases would bias our
estimates towards zero, not towards finding non-existent effects.
4.1 Forcing variable in presidential and parliamentary elections
Our forcing variable – the variable that determines assignment to treatment in our RD
design – is the margin of victory/loss of the (center-)left. In presidential elections, this
is defined as the margin of victory/loss of the left-wing candidate.13 In parliamentary
elections, it is calculated as the share of parliamentary seats won by left and center-left
parties minus 50%.
12Same holds, of course, for a closer-than-expected conservative victory.
13When elections are decided in a run-off, we consider only the run-off, not the first round.
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While for presidential elections the determination of the forcing variable is rather
obvious, for legislative elections it is not: often it is not easy to determine who wins an
election in a parliamentary system. Our choice of the forcing variable for parliamentary
elections implies defining a left-wing victory as an election in which parties classified
by Volkens et al. (2017) as ‘Socialist’, ‘Communist’, ‘Social Democratic’or ‘Ecologist’
win a majority of parliamentary seats. Of course this definition is not perfect: in some
elections left-wing parties can be divided and not willing to form a coalition; in some
elections they may be allied with centrist parties, therefore winning power even if our
running variable does not reach the threshold. However, as we show below, in most
parliamentary elections this definition of a left-wing victory works reasonably well and
– most importantly – does generate a discontinuity at the threshold.
It is possible to test empirically whether our running variable for parliamentary
elections does provide a discontinuity in the allocation of political power at the cutoff,
which can be exploited in estimation. To do this, we assess whether the probability
that a Left-led cabinet is formed after the election displays a discontinuity when the
share of parliamentary seats won by (center-)left parties crosses the 50% cutoff. Figure
3 displays the result of this test: at the cutoff, the probability of a Left-led govern-
ment jumps discontinuously and significantly. The size of the discontinuity, estimated
through kernel-weighted local linear regression using the robust bias-corrected estima-
tor of Calonico et al. (2014) and clustering standard errors by country, is 28 percentage
points and significant at the 0.05 significance level. Of course, the ability of forming
a Left-led government is not the only possible channel though which a left majority in
parliament can influence policy: also when they do not unite to form a government,
(center-)left parties may come together on single issues in the legislative process. How-
ever, what this result demonstrates is that the share of seats won by (center-)left parties
can be used as the running variable for parliamentary elections, given that it does pro-
vide a discontinuity in the political power of left parties, that can be used in estimation.
We also test for a discontinuity in the distribution of the forcing variable at the
cutoff using the McCrary (2008) test. Such a discontinuity, if significant, may signal the
possibility of systematic manipulation of electoral results, which may undermine the RD
13
identifying assumption. The McCrary test finds no significant evidence of manipulation
in parliamentary nor in presidential elections.14
4.2 Estimation method: dynamic RD specification
Consider a country i that has an election e at time t. We estimate the country’s fi-
nancial market reaction over a h-periods horizon through the following dynamic RD
specification:
∆yi,e,t+h = αh + γhZi,e + f
h(xi,e) + i,e,t+h for h = −m, ..., 0, ..., n (1)
∆yi,e,t+h is the logarithmic change in the outcome of interest between time t−1 and
t+h [ln(Y )i,e,t+h−ln(Y )i,e,t−1]; x is the forcing variable: the margin of victory/loss of the
left-wing candidate in presidential systems, the left’s share of parliamentary seats minus
50% in parliamentary systems; Z is an indicator equal to 1 if x ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise; f()
is a potentially non-linear function that we approximate through kernel-weighted local
linear regression;15
We employ two main specifications: one that uses raw returns as the outcome variable
in equation 1, and one that uses abnormal returns. The specification using raw returns
simply estimates equation 1, with y representing the raw data for the outcome of interest.
For calculating abnormal returns, we first regress ∆yi,e,t+h on time fixed-effects (at the
month-year level when using monthly data, at the day-month-year level when using
daily data) using the whole panel of financial data, and then use residuals from this
regression as the outcome variable in equation 1. This specification controlling for time
fixed-effects can be interpreted as using abnormal returns, given that the time effects
absorb all common time-varying factors. The reason why we control for time effects in
two steps is that there are very few national elections that happen in different countries
in the same month (let alone in the same day). It would thus be not only inefficient, but
impossible, to estimate time effects jointly with other parameters in equation 1, which
14The discontinuity in the distribution of the margin of victory of the left at the cutoff, estimated
through the McCrary (2008) test, is −0.18 with a standard error of 0.20 in parliamentary election, and
0.23 with a standard error of 0.21 in parliamentary election.
15We employ a triangular kernel. Results are robust to using a rectangular kernel.
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uses only observations with elections. That is why we estimate time fixed-effects in the
whole sample of financial data (including also observations without elections), and then
plug the residuals into equation 1.
5 Results
We use the dynamic regression-discontinuity design described by eq.1 to estimate our
effects of interest in a time-window around elections. Results indicate that left-wing elec-
toral victories tend to cause stock market values to decrease and the domestic currency
to depreciate, in both cases by substantial amounts. Effects at longer time-horizons (6
to 12 months) are characterized by very high dispersion. However, on average across all
elections, there is sign of reversal in both variables. Both stock market and exchange
rate effects appear stronger and more persistent in presidential systems, in elections in
which the Left’s proposed economic policy is more radical, and in the post-1990 period.
We don’t find any discernible impacts on Government bond yields at any time-horizon
and in any subsample.
5.1 Visual RD evidence
As a first step, we set h = 1 in equation 1 and plot observations and flexible regression
lines around the threshold, to evaluate visually the presence of a discontinuity. Setting
h = 1 means that we are looking at the 2-months average return between the month
before and the month after the election. This is shown in Figure 4, using monthly data on
raw returns and including all (parliamentary and presidential) elections. The depicted
flexible regression lines are estimated using kernel-weighted local linear regression, with
bandwidth selected according to the MSE-criterion.16
This exercise reveals a sizable negative discontinuity in post-election stock market
growth, and a smaller (but still substantial) one in the post-election change in the
value of the domestic currency. There is little evidence of any relevant discontinuity in
government bond yields and spreads.
16As in all baseline estimations presented here, we calculate the MSE-optimal bandwidth using the
procedure in Calonico et al. (2014).
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5.2 Dynamic RD estimations
To appreciate size, significance and dynamics of the effects, we estimate a set of RD re-
gressions following equation 1, letting h (the time-window) vary from -6 months to +12
months. We use monthly data, but in the case of share prices we are also able to look
at higher frequency (daily) data. All specifications use the Calonico et al. (2014) robust
and bias-corrected RD estimator, with MSE-optimal bandwidth, and robust standard
errors clustered by country.17
Figure 5 plots dynamic RD estimates and 95% confidence intervals using monthly
data and raw returns in the whole sample (presidential and parliamentary elections).
Tables 2 to 4 report results (with h from -6 to +6 months) for all elections, as well
as for parliamentary and presidential elections taken separately. For each sample, the
Tables report both estimates using raw returns and those using abnormal returns (that
is, controlling for common time effects).18
We find a sizable and significant negative short-term effect on stock market valua-
tions and the US dollar value of the domestic currency. Share prices decrease by 5 to
6 percentage points between the month before the election and the month after. The
stock market effect is stronger for presidential elections (7 to 9 percentage points). The
exchange rate effect is more gradual. At a 3-months horizon, the effect is around 7.5
percentage points in all elections, with no substantial difference between parliamentary
and presidential systems.
Longer-run (6 to 12 months) effects are very dispersed, signaling wide variation in
medium-run outcomes across different experiences. Our 95% confidence interval for
stock market effects in all elections at a 1-year horizon (h = 12 in equation 1) ranges
from negative effects as large as −11% to positive effects as large as 18%; 1-year ex-
change rate effects range approximately from −15% to +9%;19 This large dispersion,
of course, suggests great caution in commenting average effects. With that caveat in
17We implement the Calonico et al. (2014) robust bias-corrected estimator using the rdrobust package
in Stata (Calonico et al., 2017).
18For space reasons, in the main text we present only the Figures using raw returns; Figures using
abnormal returns are reported in Appendix B.
19We refer to the specification using raw returns here, but similar variability is observed in abnormal
returns (Tables 2 and 3).
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mind, on average we observe reversal of the negative stock market effect in the whole
sample, but not in the sample of presidential elections (Figure 5(a) and Table 2) and
partial reversal of the exchange rate effect in the whole sample, although not in the two
subsamples.20
We find no effect at any time horizon on Government bond yields and spreads. Pan-
els (c) and (d) of Figure 5 show that the effect is flat and near zero at all time-horizons,
and Table 4 confirms that this holds both in presidential and parliamentary elections,
on raw yields and controlling for common time effects.
We are able to estimate stock market effects also at a daily frequency for a large
enough number of elections (although not for all elections for which we have monthly
data). Daily-frequency effects are displayed in Figure 6 and Table 5. We do find some
anticipation effects in the days leading to the election – positive and significant coeffi-
cients at some pre-election time-horizons, which imply negative changes between day -h
and the day of the election – but only in parliamentary elections. However, the bulk of
the stock market effect happens in the first trading day after the election, when share
prices fall on average by more than 2 percentage points (5 to 6 points in presidential
elections).
5.3 Heterogeneous effects
Naturally, the treatment effect of (Center-)Left electoral victories is likely to be heteroge-
neous, depending on variation in policy platforms, political systems, industrial relations,
and socio-economic conditions in general. In what follows, we look at heterogeneity from
three perspectives: ideological, temporal (pre- and post-1990) and geographical (high-
income vs. developing countries).
Presidential vs. parliamentary elections As illustrated above (Section 5.2), esti-
mated stock market effects are substantially higher in presidential systems (Tables 5, 2,
3) than in parliamentary ones. This is likely to reflect, at least in part, our identification
20This is possible because the optimal bandwidth varies across specifications. Therefore, the ob-
servations that fall within the optimal bandwidth in the specification using the whole sample are not
equal to the union of the observations that fall within the optimal bandwidth in the two subsamples of
parliamentary and presidential elections taken separately.
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strategy, which focuses on close elections. While we have shown that there is substan-
tial discontinuity in the treatment at the cutoff in parliamentary elections (Figure 3),
this discontinuity is certainly stronger for presidential elections. For a parliamentary
coalition a close majority is a different outcome from a large one, and controlling almost
50% of the seats is different from controlling (for example) 20% (and may even allow
a minority government). In presidential elections, to the contrary, a close victory gives
to the winner the same powers as a landslide victory. We thus interpret this result
as reflecting our identification strategy, rather than underlying differences caused by
different electoral systems (which we cannot exclude nor confirm).
Heterogeneity in policy platforms First, we test whether the effect is stronger
when the (Center-)Left’s electoral economic platform is more radical. We use the policy
position estimates of Volkens et al. (2017), and in particular their variables planeco
and markeco. The variable planeco measures support for market regulation, economic
planning and government control of the economy; markeco measures support for a ‘free
market economy’ and for a smaller role of the state. We use the difference (planeco
− markeco) as a proxy for economic ideology. We divide elections in two subsamples
based on whether the economic ideology of the major Left party (measured by planeco
− markeco) is above of below its median value in the sample. We refer to the first group
as elections characterized by a ‘Neoliberal Left’, and to the second group as ‘Interven-
tionist Left’ elections.
In this test we focus only on parliamentary systems, given that Volkens et al. (ibid.)
policy position estimates are available only for parliamentary elections. Although im-
posed by data limitations, the focus on parliamentary elections is beneficial, in that it
ensures that results are not contaminated by heterogeneity based on political systems
(as discussed above).
Table 6 displays results from this exercise. As expected, the negative stock-market
and exchange-rate effects of left-wing electoral victories are stronger and much more
persistent in elections in which the Left’s proposed economic policy is more radical.
Stock market effects in the two subsamples have the same direction but different in-
tensity in the short-run, and they diverge even in sign in the medium run. The 1-month
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stock-market decrease is stronger by around one percentage point in ‘Interventionist
Left’ elections; the 3-months effect is negative but close to zero and non significant for
‘Neoliberal Left’ elections, but significant and substantial (around 9%) in ‘Intervention-
ist Left’ elections. The one-year effect is actually positive and substantial for ‘Neoliberal
Left’ elections, negative and substantial for ‘Interventionist Left’ elections – although in
both cases very imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant.
The picture is similar – and even more striking – for exchange rate dynamics. The
smaller number of observations available (mainly due to the exclusion of elections held
under fixed/pegged exchange rate systems), however, suggests caution in interpreting
exchange rate results: there are relatively few effective (i.e., within the bandwidth) ob-
servations in each subsample. With this caveat in mind, also exchange rate effects are
milder and temporary in the ‘Neoliberal Left’ subsample, larger and persistent in the
‘Interventionist Left’ subsample. The 1-year effect in the ‘Intervenionist Left’ subsample
is remarkably large (around 30%) and significant, although it has to be taken with great
caution due to the low number of observations.
Time-varying effects Second, we test whether the effects were stronger in earlier
elections or in more recent (post-1990) ones.21 Results are reported in Table 7. We find
both stock market and exchange rate effects to be stronger in the post-1990 period. This
may reflect higher capital mobility in the more recent period. We exclude the 1970 Chile
election, which had an extraordinarily high effect on stock market valuations (Girardi
and Bowles, 2018), from this test, but the result that effects are stronger post-1990 is
robust to including it.
Cross-country heterogeneity Third, we test for different effects in industrialized
vs. developing countries. We use OECD membership in 1970 as the (time-invariant)
criterion for identifying high-income economies.22 Results are reported in Table 8. Both
stock market and exchange rate effects are stronger in non-OECD countries. Also in
21We choose 1990 as the breakpoint both because of the global political discontinuity represented by
the fall of the Soviet Union, and because it allows to retain a reasonably large number of observations
in both (pre- and post-) subsamples.
22This includes Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (West
Germany pre-1989), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
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this test we exclude the Chile 1970 election (Chile was not part of the OECD in 1970,
so including this election would strengthen the result of larger effects in developing
countries).
6 Robustness and falsification tests
We perform a battery of robustness and falsification tests. We try alternative bandwidth
selection criteria (Sec. 6.1); we perform falsification tests using placebo thresholds (6.2)
and placebo election dates (6.3); we try excluding the few most influential observations
(Sec. 6.4); finally, we restrict our sample to country-years with flexible exchange rates
and non-missing values for all our financial outcomes of interest (6.5).
6.1 Alternative bandwidth selection criteria
We re-estimate our baseline regression-discontinuity specification (eq. 1) using alterna-
tive bandwidth selection criteria. Results are reported in Table 9. The first column
reports, for the sake of comparison, our baseline results using a MSE-optimal band-
width selected according to the procedure in Calonico et al. (2014). The second column
also uses a MSE-optimal bandwidth, but selects two different bandwidth sizes below and
above the threshold. The third column uses the MSE-optimal bandwidth, but employing
the procedure in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The fourth and fifth columns use
a CER (coverage error rate)-optimal bandwidth, respectively with a common size and
with different sizes on the two sides of the threshold. For all our outcomes of interest,
we find results to be insensitive to the specific bandwidth selection criterion employed.
6.2 Placebo thresholds
Our first falsification test investigates the presence of significant discontinuities in our
outcomes of interest further away from the true threshold that assigns electoral victory.
A tendency to find significant discontinuities in correspondence of placebo thresholds
would cast doubts on the ‘smoothness’ assumption which underlies our RD design, and
suggest that our results may be spurious.
To do this, we randomly draw 200 placebo thresholds, plot the resulting distribution
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of t-statistics from the estimation of equation 1 with h = 1, and then compare it with the
t-statistics obtained at the true threshold. The placebo thresholds are drawn separately
on the left and on the right side of the true threshold (100 draws on each side) and
only observations from that same side are used in estimation, in order to avoid potential
mis-specification due to assuming continuity at the true threshold. We use only placebo
thresholds that guarantee at least 50 observations in each side within the bandwidth, to
avoid biasing our test against significant findings because of weak statistical power.
Results are reported in Figure 7, which plots the distribution of t-statistics for each
financial outcome of interest. Reassuringly, the t-statistics from our baseline estimation
at the true threshold (indicated by the vertical dashed lines) are in the tails of the
distribution of placebo t-stats, and there is little evidence of a tendency to find significant
discontinuities away from the threshold. The ‘true’ t-statistics for the effect on bond
yields and spreads are instead confirmed to be non-significant relative to the placebo
distribution.23
6.3 Placebo election dates
As a second falsification test, we try substituting placebo election dates for the true
election dates. We estimate equation 1, again setting h = 1. We shift our election dates
backwards by 36 to 0 months. For a country which has a (true) election e at time t,
using the same notation as in eq. 1, we estimate:
∆yi,e,t−s+1 = αs + γsZi,e + fs(xi,e) + i,e,t−s+1 for s = 36, ..., 0 (2)
Figure 8 plots t-statistics for the placebo-effects against s (the number of months by
which the election dates have been shifted). Panel (a) uses raw returns and (b) uses
abnormal returns. Reassuringly, for both stock market and exchange rate effects, the
only statistically significant coefficients (at the 0.05 significance level) are obtained at
the true election dates (s = −1 and s = 0, which both contain true post-election
observations), while the time-shifted placebos all produce non-significant results.
23Figure 7 uses raw returns. Figure B.4 in Appendix B reports results from the same exercise using
abnormal returns (ie, returns residualized on time effects).
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6.4 Sensitivity to influential observations
To check if our results are driven by few instances of large financial market reactions, we
calculate DFBeta coefficients for the effect of left-wing electoral victories, and re-estimate
our RD specification (eq. 1) after excluding observations with the largest DFBetas.24.
Specifically, in each regression we exclude the observations with |DFBeta| > 2/√N .25
As expected, influential observations (as identified by the DFBeta coefficients) cor-
respond to well-known cases of close elections characterized by large policy divergence.
These include, for example, Chile’s 1970 presidential election, closely won by Socialist
candidate Allende (Girardi and Bowles, 2018); France’s 1981 presidential election, closely
won by the communist-socialist coalition supporting Mitterrand (Sachs and Wyplosz,
1986); Portugal’s 1979 parliamentary election, in which the center-right coalition Alianc¸a
Democra´tica won a slight majority of parliamentary seats, allowing the formation of a
conservative government.
Results from this robustness test are reported in Table 10, and indicate that our re-
sults are robust to excluding influential observations. We detect many more influential
observations in the estimates of the stock market effects (between 21 and 28) than in
those of exchange rate effects (between 3 and 7). When excluding those observations,
point estimates get smaller, however they remain statistically significant, with even an
increase in precision in most cases, and economically relevant.
6.5 Common sample
Because of data availability, the samples we use for estimating our stock, currency and
bond market effects do not perfectly overlap. A possible concern is that the different
effects that we find on our outcomes may be driven by the (partly) different samples
used. For instance, if also stock market and exchange rate effects were absent when
24For simplicity, we calculate DFBeta coefficients using simple (unweighted) local linear regression
within the optimal bandwidth and conventional standard errors, as an approximation to our kernel-
weighted local linear regression estimator with robust standard errors. However, when re-estimating eq.
1 after excluding influential observations, we use kernel-weigthed local regression and robust standard
errors, as in the baseline specifications; so the estimates from this robustness test are directly comparable
to those from the baseline specification.
25Using |DFBeta| > 2/√N as the cutoff for defining influential observations is recommended by
Belsley et al. (2005 [1980]) and is standard in the literature.
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restricting attention to the (smaller) sample for which bond yields data are available,
this would cast doubt on our result that bond markets are unaffected.
To investigate this potential concern, we estimate our baseline dynamic RD spec-
ification, restricting the sample to those elections for which all financial outcomes of
interest (share prices, exchange rate, bond yields and bond spreads) are simultaneously
available. The resulting sample is, unfortunately, rather small (147 elections). Notwith-
standing the small size, it produces results qualitatively analogous to those found using
all the available elections for each variable (results are reported in Table 11). We thus
conclude that the different impact on share prices and exchange rates on the one hand,
and bond yields on the other, is not driven by the use of partially different samples.
7 Discussion
A negative reaction of share prices and the domestic exchange rate to (center-)left elec-
toral victories may reflect the expectation of polices that are less favorable to capital and
more tolerant of inflation, relative to the counter-factual of a conservative victory. The
exchange rate effect may also be driven or exacerbated by resulting capital outflows. Of
course, we cannot rule out alternative channels like expectations of lower GDP growth
or measures that favor potential entrants over currently existing firms (Snowberg et al.,
2007, p. 824).
Quantifying the importance of different potential channels is outside the scope of
this paper, and represents a promising avenue for further research, possibly using firm-
level data. Girardi and Bowles (2018) provide some empirical assessment of potential
channels in their study of Allende’s election (which is part of our sample) and subse-
quent coup in 1970s Chile. They show that the stock market reaction to these events
is characterized by a large aggregate effect with small firm- and sector-level variation,
and that measures of sensitivity to growth prospects and wage dynamics do not predict
price changes after the two events. Based on these tests and a reading of the historical
evidence, they argue that the effect was not due to changes in growth prospects nor
expected wage policy, but a generalized weakening of private property rights. It would
be unwarranted, however, to generalize their considerations and empirical results to all
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or most of the elections studied in this paper: the episodes they study are arguably
unique in the large variation they generate in the political status of private property
rights (Girardi and Bowles, 2018, pp. 25-26). Expected changes in the share of capital
through wage and tax policies are likely to be important in most other elections.
Effects at longer time-horizons display remarkable variability, which suggests great
caution in discussing average medium-run outcomes. With this important caveat in
mind, on average we observe (at least partial) reversal of the stock market and exchange
rate effects, at least in high income economies and in elections in which the Left’s eco-
nomic policy platform is more free-market oriented. If true, this may imply potential
arbitrage opportunities. A possible explanation would be that left-wing coalitions sys-
tematically surprise holders of capital after having gained power, by failing to deliver
redistribution in favor of capital and/or higher inflation.26 Reversal of the effects could
also be seen as a manifestation of the well-documented phenomenon of ‘overreaction’,
which leads to excessive pessimism over bad news and excessive optimism over good
ones (Bondt and Thaler, 1985). It should also be noted that limits to arbitrage are
substantial in this context: close left-wing electoral victories are relatively rare events,
and each displays relevant heterogeneity.
The absence of significant effects on 10-years government bond yields and spreads
may imply that interest rates are not impacted, or that the impact has a different sign
in different left-wing electoral victories. Heterogeneity could be due, for example, to
different degrees of Central Bank independence. For instance, an independent Central
Bank may be expected to raise interest rates in reaction to more expansionary economic
policy, but with a lower degree of independence, a government which aims to stimulate
the economy may pressure the Central Bank into decreasing interest rates. Moreover,
different episodes are likely to differ in the extent of monetary sovereignty and in the
propensity of Central Banks to actively control interest rates.
26Of course, as we are measuring effects relative to the counter-factual of a close electoral loss of
the Left, it may be conservative coalitions that systematically fail to deliver the expected increases in
profitability.
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8 Conclusions
Using a dynamic regression-discontinuity design, we have uncovered a substantial reac-
tion of stock and currency markets to electoral outcomes in a large panel of national
elections in the 1945-2018 period. We find that close (center-)left electoral victories
cause real share prices to decrease by 5% to 6% in the month following the election (7%
to 9% in presidential elections), and the domestic currency to depreciate by around 7%
in three months. We have found no significant effects on government bonds’ (real and
nominal) yields and spreads.
Effects at longer time-horizons (6 to 12 months) display great variability, making it
hard to assess average medium-run effects. With this caveat in mind, on average we
find some evidence of reversal, which may imply ‘overreaction’ to electoral outcomes.
Stock market and exchange rate effects are stronger and more persistent in elections
in which the Left’s proposed economic policy is more radical, in developing countries,
and in the post-1990 period.
Of course, estimates exploiting close electoral outcomes are bound to underestimate
the effects of interest: markets must have discounted some positive probability of a Left
victory before the election. Given our focus on close elections, it would appear natural
to assume a 50% ex-ante probability of a left-wing victory. Under this assumption, the
full underlying effects would be twice as large as the estimate presented here.27
A natural explanation for the negative reaction of stock and currency markets to
left-wing electoral victories is the expectation of policies that are relatively less favor-
able to capital and more tolerant of inflation, but other potential mechanisms are also
possible. Gauging the importance of different potential channels is outside the scope of
this paper and represents a promising avenue for further research.
27This calculation ignores risk-aversion, for the sake of simplicity and because of the lack of cross-
country data on the average degree of risk aversion in the markets studied here.
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Figure 1: Share prices around selected elections
Share price index normalized to 100 in the day before the election on the vertical axis. Trading days
around election on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 2: Descriptive evidence: financial dynamics around Left victories (monthly data)
The graphs plot average financial outcomes around (center-)left electoral victories, relative to electoral
losses. Outcomes are normalized to zero in the month preceding the election. Months relative to the
month of the election on the horizontal axis. Figures on the left include all available elections. Figures
on the right include only elections in which the margin of victory/loss of the Left is not greater than
±5% (close elections). Dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors clustered
by country.
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Figure 3: Parliamentary elections: share of seats won by the Left and probability of a
Left-led Government (n=405)
The graph displays the effect of left-wing parties winning a parliamentary majority on the probability
that a Left-led Government is formed after the election. The vertical axis displays a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a Left-led Government is formed after the election (sources indicated in the main text).
The horizontal axis displays the share of parliamentary seats won by parties classified as ‘Socialist’,
‘Communist’, ‘Social-Democratic’ or ‘Ecologist’ by the Manifesto Project Database. Fitted lines are
estimated semi-parametrically through kernel-weighted local linear regression, with mean squared
error-optimal bandwidth.
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Figure 4: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory on financial markets
(Regression-discontinuity estimates; monthly data)
The vertical axis displays the percentage change in the outcome between time t− 1 and time t + 1,
where t is the election month. The horizontal axis displays the Left’s margin of victory: the margin of
the left-wing candidate in presidential systems; the Left’s share of parliamentary seats minus 50% in
legislative systems. Fitted lines are estimated semi-parametrically through kernel-weighted local linear
regression, with mean squared error-optimal bandwidth. The graphs correspond to eq. 1, with h = 1.
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Figure 5: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory on financial markets
(Dynamic regression-discontinuity estimates; monthly data)
The graph displays the effect of a left-victory on the outcomes of interest in a time-window including 6
months before the election and 12 months after. Estimated through the dynamic
regression-discontinuity specification of eq. 1, with h varying from -6 to +12 months. Coefficients are
multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the variable).
For each time-horizon considered, we estimate eq.1 through kernel-weighted local linear regressions
(triangular kernel), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014). Dashed lines are 95%
confidence intervals from robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered by country.
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Figure 6: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory on stock market valuations
(Dynamic regression-discontinuity estimates; daily data)
The graph displays the effect of a left-victory on the outcomes of interest in a time-window including 20
days before the election and 30 trading days after. Estimated through the dynamic
regression-discontinuity specification of eq. 1, with h varying from -20 to +30 trading days. Coefficients
are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the
variable). For each time-horizon considered, we estimate eq.1 through kernel-weighted local linear
regressions (triangular kernel), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014). Dashed
lines are 95% confidence intervals from robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered by country.
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Figure 7: Falsification test with placebo thresholds
(vertical red dotted line = estimate from true threshold)
The figure reports the empirical distribution of t-statistics from our regression discontinuity estimate of
the treatment effect (eq. 1, with h=1), based on 200 randomly drawn placebo thresholds. Placebo
thresholds were drawn separately on the left and on the right side of the true threshold (100 on each
side), using only observations belonging to that side, to avoid mis-specification arising from assuming
continuity at the true threshold. In each graph, the vertical red dotted line represents the t-statistics
obtained from using the true threshold. The t-stats are obtained from robust bias-corrected standard
errors (Calonico et al., 2014) clustered by country.
37
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
t-s
ta
tis
tic
s (
2-
m
on
th
s e
ffe
ct)
-40 -30 -20 -10 0
Shift from actual election date (months)
Exchange Rate
Stock Market
(a) Raw returns specification
-2
-1
0
1
2
t-s
ta
tis
tic
s (
2-
m
on
th
s e
ffe
ct)
-40 -30 -20 -10 0
Shift from actual election date (months)
Exchange Rate
Stock Market
(b) Abnormal returns specification
Figure 8: Falsification test with time-shifted placebo election dates
On the vertical axis, t-statistics for the 2-months effect of Left electoral victories (obtained from
estimating equation 1, with h=1). On the horizontal axis, the number of months by which we have
shifted the election dates backward (at −1 and 0, estimates include true election dates; 0 corresponds to
our baseline specification). The t-stats are obtained from robust bias-corrected standard errors
(Calonico et al., 2014) clustered by country. In the abnormal returns specification (panel b),
time-effects previously filtered-out through a regression of the outcome on month-year dummies.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean S.D. Min Max
(a) Elections data
All elections
Left margin of victory 954 -6.0 29.7 -95.2 100.0
Left victory 954 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0
Left government 403 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0
planeco 608 5.5 4.8 0.0 36.1
markeco 608 2.0 2.6 0.0 23.1
Econ. policy (planeco-markeco) 608 3.4 5.7 -23.1 36.1
Political system 676 1.4 0.9 0.0 2.0
Presidential elections
Left margin of victory 333 5.6 42.1 -95.2 100.0
Left victory 333 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0
Political system 126 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Parliamentary elections
Left margin of victory 621 -12.2 17.1 -50.0 46.6
Left victory 621 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0
Left government 403 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0
planeco 608 5.5 4.8 0.0 36.1
markeco 608 2.0 2.6 0.0 23.1
Econ. policy (planeco-markeco) 608 3.4 5.7 -23.1 36.1
Political system 550 1.7 0.7 0.0 2.0
(b) Financial data
Monthly
Real share prices (2010=100) 50,462 12,028.6 239,335.7 0.01 8,805,724
Exchange rate (USD per unit) 58,924 2.5e+11 5.8e+12 1.45e-11 1.5e+14
Real gov’t bond yields 32,881 1.7 15.1 -776.6 159.3
Nominal gov’t bond yields 33,364 7.9 7.0 -0.6 161.0
Nominal spread (vs. US) 32,485 2.8 6.9 -9.4 159.3
Real spread (vs. US) 31,986 -0.1 15.0 -766.8 159.3
Fixed/pegged exchange rate 80,190 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0
Daily
Share prices (2010=100) 713,278 119.2 2,722.7 0.01 444,298.4
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Table 2: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory on stock market valuations (RD Estimates)
- Monthly Data
Outcome: log change in share prices between t− 1 and t + h
h (months) All elections Presidential Parliamentary
elections elections
-6 2.45 0.59 -3.36 -2.74 3.31 0.79
(3.67) (2.88) (8.20) (6.66) (4.04) (3.17)
-5 0.64 -0.80 -2.63 -1.39 0.27 -1.44
(3.23) (2.50) (7.37) (5.97) (3.69) (2.90)
-4 -1.50 -2.52 -3.71 -2.94 0.06 -1.59
(2.69) (2.11) (6.09) (5.16) (2.80) (2.24)
-3 -2.49 −2.83∗ -3.53 -2.74 -0.81 -1.81
(2.17) (1.71) (4.39) (3.85) (2.38) (1.79)
-2 -0.67 -1.00 -1.58 -1.42 -0.07 -0.45
(1.06) (0.88) (2.17) (1.90) (1.12) (0.86)
-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
0 −2.82∗∗ −2.24∗ −5.96∗ -4.76 -1.43 -1.35
(1.42) (1.35) (3.06) (3.02) (1.57) (1.36)
+1 −6.10∗∗ −5.15∗∗ −9.18∗ −7.40∗ -5.20 −4.93∗
(2.42) (2.44) (4.96) (4.44) (3.43) (2.94)
+2 −5.01∗ -4.34 -6.71 -4.46 -4.69 -4.50
(2.98) (2.66) (5.51) (4.65) (3.97) (3.16)
+3 -3.52 -2.62 -6.37 -4.22 -2.37 -2.79
(3.17) (3.10) (6.34) (6.01) (4.05) (3.53)
+4 -2.00 -2.31 -6.71 -4.06 -0.42 -2.45
(4.02) (3.78) (8.05) (6.96) (4.52) (4.11)
+5 -2.98 -3.06 -9.36 -6.89 -1.81 -3.39
(4.81) (4.12) (9.65) (8.46) (5.05) (4.49)
+6 -2.43 -2.96 -12.51 -9.59 -0.75 -3.13
(5.33) (4.75) (11.55) (10.06) (5.63) (4.93)
+12 4.33 2.47 -13.80 -6.88 9.33 2.98
(7.31) (6.47) (14.85) (10.55) (8.36) (7.56)
Time FE X X X
Obs 753 753 199 199 555 555
Eff. obs 445 462 115 121 284 292
Each row represents a separate regression and reports the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on the
logarithmic change in average share prices between time t− 1 and time t + h. Coefficients are
multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the variable).
For each time-horizon considered, we estimate eq.1 through kernel-weighted local linear regression
(triangular kernel), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014). Robust bias-corrected
standard errors clustered by country. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. The number of observations
refers to the specification with time-horizon h = 0.
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Table 3: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory on the domestic exchange rate (Dynamic
RD Estimates – monthly data)
Outcome: log change in domestic exchange rate between t− 1 and t + h
h (months) All elections Presidential Parliamentary
elections elections
-6 1.96 3.15 -5.60 -2.28 10.61 6.12
(4.12) (4.45) (4.39) (5.05) (7.16) (6.31)
-5 0.33 1.67 -1.79 1.94 2.09 2.13
(3.64) (3.58) (3.50) (4.19) (5.29) (4.93)
-4 0.98 1.36 0.14 0.23 2.21 2.37
(3.00) (2.89) (2.64) (3.49) (4.58) (4.09)
-3 1.68 1.73 3.53 3.73 1.63 1.52
(1.96) (1.97) (3.29) (3.86) (2.35) (2.08)
-2 1.48∗ 0.88 1.92 0.81 1.35 1.00
(0.81) (0.86) (1.47) (1.72) (0.86) (0.82)
-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
0 −2.07∗ -1.60 -3.48 -2.76 −2.57∗∗ −2.85∗∗∗
(1.19) (1.18) (2.75) (2.61) (1.06) (1.09)
+1 −4.12∗∗ −4.08∗∗ -3.16 -3.33 -4.54** −4.50∗∗
(1.79) (1.80) (3.82) (3.44) (1.81) (1.92)
+2 −5.24∗∗ −5.20∗∗ -4.51 -5.11 -4.30** −3.54∗
(2.08) (2.14) (4.40) (4.19) (2.06) (2.05)
+3 −7.35∗∗∗ −7.68∗∗∗ -5.69 -5.58 -6.10** −5.34∗∗
(2.67) (2.83) (5.36) (5.45) (2.48) (2.58)
+4 −4.69∗ −4.84∗ -4.53 -1.92 −7.81∗∗∗ −6.96∗∗
(2.71) (2.74) (5.65) (5.45) (2.89) (2.88)
+5 -2.25 -2.12 -3.60 -0.85 −8.93∗∗ −7.68∗∗
(3.17) (3.05) (6.83) (6.72) (3.95) (3.73)
+6 -2.11 -2.58 -3.75 -2.57 −9.12∗∗ -6.19
(3.63) (3.49) (7.72) (7.45) (4.62) (4.19)
+12 -3.06 -6.00 -8.19 -7.81 -13.23 -10.67
(6.13) (5.56) (10.39) (10.65) (8.22) (6.93)
Time FE X X X
Obs 607 607 258 258 350 350
Eff. obs. 315 339 102 113 112 108
Each row represents a separate regression and reports the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on the
logarithmic change in the domestic exchange rate (US dollars per unit of domestic currency) between
time t− 1 and time t + h. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation (so a coefficient
of 1 means a 1% increase in the variable). For each time-horizon considered, we estimate eq.1 through
kernel-weighted local linear regression (triangular kernel), using the bias-corrected procedure of
Calonico et al. (2014). Robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered by country.
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. The number of observations refers to the specification with
time-horizon h = 0.
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Table 4: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory on 10-year Government bond yields and
spreads (RD Estimates)
Outcome: change in bond yields (%) between t− 1 and t + h
h (months) Real yield Real Spread Nominal Spread
(All elections) (All elections) (All elections)
-6 -0.28 0.12 -0.06 0.19 0.13 -0.06
(0.93) (0.89) (0.92) (0.91) (0.25) (0.19)
-5 -0.60 -0.39 0.29 -0.21 0.35 -0.05
(0.93) (0.91) (0.82) (0.94) (0.25) (0.22)
-4 -0.37 0.03 -0.30 -0.46 0.48∗ 0.34
(0.81) (0.73) (0.79) (0.78) (0.25) (0.26)
-3 0.43 0.29 0.75 0.29 0.38 0.19
(0.57) (0.51) (0.57) (0.51) (0.25) (0.24)
-2 -0.30 -0.30 -0.08 -0.31 -0.07 -0.13
(0.36) (0.34) (0.38) (0.34) (0.19) (0.14)
-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
0 0.02 -0.17 -0.16 -0.31 0.41∗ 0.23
(0.35) (0.33) (0.34) (0.30) (0.21) (0.20)
+1 -0.58 -0.89 -0.53 −1.04∗ 0.31 0.05
(0.48) (0.56) (0.55) (0.62) (0.30) (0.24)
+2 -0.86 -1.03 -0.61 -1.06 0.25 -0.09
(0.58) (0.72) (0.60) (0.70) (0.23) (0.26)
+3 0.53 0.25 0.87 0.37 0.62 0.33
(0.79) (0.90) (0.83) (0.96) (0.38) (0.38)
+4 0.60 0.33 0.95 0.34 0.12 -0.07
(1.21) (1.31) (1.35) (1.35) (0.25) (0.21)
+5 0.77 0.32 1.41 0.41 0.10 -0.12
(1.41) (1.54) (1.71) (1.68) (0.30) (0.24)
+6 1.08 0.63 2.07 0.89 0.14 0.01
(1.54) (1.64) (1.92) (1.84) (0.31) (0.30)
+12 -0.27 -0.65 1.50 -0.30 -0.59 -0.60
(1.43) (1.40) (2.43) (1.99) (0.37) (0.37)
Time FE X X X
Obs. 567 567 549 549 553 553
Eff. Obs. 350 310 258 249 253 259
Each row represents a separate regression and reports the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on the
change in yields (or spreads) between time t− 1 and time t + h. Spreads are calculated as the
difference between domestic and US government bonds yields. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for
ease of interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the variable). For each time-horizon
considered, we estimate eq.1 through kernel-weighted local linear regression (triangular kernel), using
the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014). Robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered
by country. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. The number of observations refers to the specification
with time-horizon h = 0.
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Table 5: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory on stock market valuations (RD Estimates)
- Daily data
Outcome: log change in share prices between t− 1 and t + h
h (trading
days) All elections Presidential Parliamentary
elections elections
-6 1.85∗∗ 0.79 -0.41 -0.18 3.05∗∗∗ 1.68∗
(0.91) (0.74) (1.53) (1.58) (1.08) (0.96)
-5 1.51∗ 0.50 -0.70 -0.54 2.69∗∗∗ 1.13
(0.88) (0.75) (1.64) (1.71) (0.69) (0.75)
-4 0.82 0.17 -0.54 -0.57 1.69∗∗∗ 0.60
(0.75) (0.67) (1.57) (1.53) (0.59) (0.61)
-3 0.27 -0.10 -1.03 -1.40 0.94∗ 0.33
(0.58) (0.51) (1.22) (1.23) (0.53) (0.45)
-2 0.37 -0.04 -0.69 -0.79 0.79∗∗ 0.29
(0.37) (0.35) (0.79) (0.74) (0.35) (0.31)
-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
0 -0.30 -0.24 −0.61∗ -0.36 0.15∗ -0.01
(0.20) (0.23) (0.36) (0.36) (0.08) (0.20)
+1 −2.77∗∗ −2.24∗∗ −4.68∗∗ −3.47∗ −2.23∗∗ −1.92∗∗∗
(1.12) (1.07) (2.10) (1.98) (0.90) (0.66)
+2 −2.80∗∗ −2.59∗∗ −6.69∗∗∗ -5.09** -1.32 -1.74**
(1.37) (1.18) (2.56) (2.38) (1.01) (0.88)
+3 −2.54∗ −2.70∗∗ −6.35∗∗ -5.04* -0.65 -1.26
(1.47) (1.31) (2.88) (2.76) (1.11) (0.87)
+4 -2.84 −3.29∗∗ −8.05∗∗ −6.75∗ -0.66 -1.59
(1.95) (1.64) (3.63) (3.47) (1.14) (1.04)
+5 -2.08 −2.95∗∗ −6.11∗ −5.07∗ -0.73 −1.83∗
(1.72) (1.33) (3.29) (3.02) (1.23) (1.02)
+6 -3.04 −3.13∗ −7.08∗ −6.01∗ -0.89 −2.25∗
(1.87) (1.71) (3.73) (3.46) (1.44) (1.21)
+7 −3.43∗ −3.24∗ -6.38 -5.12 -1.21 -1.15
(1.98) (1.83) (4.17) (3.87) (1.45) (1.21)
+8 −3.63∗ -3.08 -6.41 -5.48 -1.58 -1.11
(1.98) (1.94) (4.42) (4.08) (1.48) (1.24)
+9 -3.46 -2.78 -6.25 -5.82 -1.94 −2.65∗∗
(2.17) (1.97) (4.83) (4.29) (1.49) (1.28)
+10 −4.02∗ -3.12 -5.86 -5.45 −2.68∗ −2.85∗∗
(2.20) (2.05) (5.01) (4.38) (1.57) (1.36)
Time FE X X X
Obs 519 519 149 149 419 419
Eff. Obs. 272 268 106 99 88 189
Each row represents a separate regression and reports the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on the
logarithmic change in average share prices between time t− 1 and time t + h. Coefficients are
multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the variable).
For each time-horizon considered, we estimate eq.1 through kernel-weighted local linear regression
(triangular kernel), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014). Robust bias-corrected
standard errors clustered by country. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. The number of observations
refers to the specification with time-horizon h = 0.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous effect of left-wing electoral victories based on Left’s policy
positions (RD Estimates; parliamentary elections)
h (months) Stock market Exchange rate
Neoliberal Left Interventionist Left Neoliberal Left Interventionist Left
+1 -4.36 -4.27 −5.70∗∗ −5.12∗∗ −3.98∗∗ -3.23 −5.40∗ −6.76∗∗
(5.37) (4.69) (2.66) (2.00) (1.70) (2.16) (2.81) (2.63)
+3 -0.39 -0.36 −8.48∗ −9.67∗∗ -2.16 -1.99 −10.43∗∗∗ −5.02∗
(6.05) (5.06) (4.79) (4.06) (2.97) (1.92) (3.52) (2.91)
+6 0.02 0.45 -7.89 -8.50 4.21 1.62 −18.04∗∗ -8.46
(7.39) (6.01) (7.60) (6.99) (4.13) (4.28) (7.41) (5.17)
+12 14.08 13.73 -9.00 −13.11∗ 2.76 6.04 −32.19∗∗ −30.18∗∗
(11.07) (9.70) (10.77) (7.72) (7.14) (6.62) (15.06) (13.49)
Obs 285 285 286 286 180 180 181 181
Eff. obs 155 179 125 153 96 84 48 48
Time FE X X X X
h (months) Gov’t Bonds: Real Yields Gov’t Bonds: Spread vs. US
Neoliberal Left Interventionist Left Neoliberal Left Interventionist Left
+1 0.48 0.50 -0.64 -0.36 1.92∗∗ 0.67 0.11 -0.17
(0.43) (0.37) (0.40) (0.70) (0.79) (0.57) (0.45) (0.95)
+3 2.42 2.07 -0.73 -0.67 3.36 2.49 -0.83 -0.49
(2.03) (1.82) (0.51) (0.89) (2.39) (2.19) (0.78) (0.71)
+6 4.68 4.10 -0.42 2.08 6.69 5.76 1.74 1.91
(4.82) (4.20) (1.15) (1.91) (6.21) (5.51) (1.42) (1.65)
+12 5.86 4.83 -2.14 1.04 8.80 7.01 3.79* 1.51
(6.59) (4.90) (1.96) (2.15) (8.14) (6.26) (2.25) (2.61)
Obs 235 235 229 229 225 225 222 222
Eff. Obs. 90 85 66 52 52 54 68 50
Time FE X X X X
Each row represents a separate regression and reports the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on the
logarithmic change in the outcome between time t− 1 and time t + h. The ‘Neoliberal Left’
specifications include only elections in which the proposed economic policy of the main Left party was
more pro-market than the median. The ‘Interventionist left’ specifications include only elections in
which the proposed economic policy of the main Left party was less pro-market than the median.
Proposed economic policy proxied by the difference between the variables planeco-markeco from the
Manifesto Project Database (Volkens et al., 2017). Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of
interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the variable). For each time-horizon
considered, we estimate eq.1 through kernel-weighted local linear regression (triangular kernel), using
the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014). Robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered
by country in parenthesis. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. The number of observations refers to the
specification with time-horizon h = 1.
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Table 7: Heterogeneous effect of left-wing electoral victories: pre and post 1990 (RD
Estimates; parliamentary and presidential elections)
h (months) Stock market Exchange rate
pre-1990 post-1990 pre-1990 post-1990
+1 -3.38 -2.70 −5.96∗∗ −5.89∗∗∗ −2.99∗∗ -2.55 −6.47∗∗ −5.87∗∗
(3.81) (3.58) (2.70) (2.25) (1.48) (1.76) (2.80) (2.28)
+3 -0.39 -0.52 -2.21 -3.57 -3.06 -3.50 −10.52∗∗∗ −10.55∗∗
(4.91) (4.26) (4.09) (3.92) (2.81) (3.12) (4.00) (4.24)
+6 4.93 2.99 -8.76 −12.13∗ -2.60 -3.87 -6.58 -5.02
(6.38) (5.61) (7.18) (6.35) (4.93) (5.03) (6.55) (5.98)
+12 10.49 8.89 -2.38 -8.88 3.31 1.20 -13.68 -13.34
(9.86) (8.73) (11.76) (8.78) (6.62) (6.69) (11.48) (9.87)
Obs 337 337 414 414 237 237 366 366
Eff.obs 235 235 186 190 92 96 174 198
Time FE X X X X
h (months) Gov’t Bonds: Real Yields Gov’t Bonds: Spread vs. US
pre-1990 post-1990 pre-1990 post-1990
+1 −0.80∗ -0.31 -0.76 -1.29 1.03∗ 0.16 -0.60 -1.41
(0.48) (0.47) (0.96) (1.01) (0.58) (0.56) (1.00) (1.07)
+3 2.38 2.17 0.87 0.26 3.32 2.42 1.00 0.10
(2.07) (1.91) (1.37) (1.35) (2.59) (2.42) (1.40) (1.32)
+6 2.77 5.46 -0.35 -0.09 6.87 7.61 0.33 0.16
(2.90) (4.75) (2.67) (2.68) (6.09) (6.89) (2.83) (2.66)
+12 2.80 2.86 -1.00 -1.08 12.45 8.45 -1.00 -1.11
(4.14) (4.24) (2.32) (2.37) (10.09) (8.05) (2.38) (2.43)
Obs 269 269 297 297 258 258 290 290
Eff.obs 132 113 197 185 77 88 194 174
Time FE X X X X
Each row represents a separate regression and reports the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on the
logarithmic change in the outcome between time t− 1 and time t + h. The Chile 1970 presidential
election, which had an extraordinarily large effect on stock market valuations (Girardi and Bowles,
2018), was excluded. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation (so a coefficient of 1
means a 1% increase in the variable). For each time-horizon considered, we estimate eq.1 through
kernel-weighted local linear regression (triangular kernel), using the bias-corrected procedure of
Calonico et al. (2014). Robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis.
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. The number of observations refers to the specification with
time-horizon h = 1.
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Table 8: Heterogeneous effect of left-wing electoral victories based on OECD member-
ship in 1970 (RD Estimates; parliamentary and presidential elections)
h (months) Stock market Exchange rate
OECD (1970) non-OECD (1970) OECD (1970) non-OECD (1970)
+1 -4.85 -2.84 −6.12∗ −5.60∗ −2.52∗∗ -2.75 −6.69∗ −6.11∗
(3.36) (2.45) (3.34) (3.03) (1.15) (1.69) (3.67) (3.18)
+3 -3.78 -1.75 -0.64 -1.49 -1.50 -2.82 −13.69∗∗ −12.45∗∗
(4.17) (3.48) (6.05) (5.66) (1.67) (1.97) (5.34) (5.46)
+6 -1.32 -1.72 -10.04 -10.84 2.11 -2.30 -8.38 -5.61
(5.85) (4.77) (10.78) (9.10) (2.71) (4.21) (7.69) (6.60)
+12 9.31 5.52 -12.28 -8.24 1.94 -4.02 -12.16 -10.72
(8.47) (7.54) (15.95) (10.68) (4.79) (5.66) (12.50) (10.19)
Obs 478 478 273 273 268 268 335 335
Eff. obs. 299 380 122 122 133 106 118 121
Time FE X X X X
h (months) Gov’t Bonds: Real Yields Gov’t Bonds: Spread vs. US
OECD (1970) non-OECD (1970) OECD (1970) non-OECD (1970)
+1 -0.61 -0.65 -1.27 -1.65 0.21 -0.64 -1.36 -1.66
(0.37) (0.43) (2.34) (2.15) (0.34) (0.44) (2.32) (2.15)
+3 0.19 0.36 4.08 3.04 0.69 0.51 3.58 3.03
(0.76) (0.99) (4.38) (4.35) (0.91) (1.06) (4.21) (4.36)
+6 0.01 0.39 -0.12 -0.15 2.33 1.26 0.27 -0.16
(0.98) (1.52) (8.49) (8.57) (2.19) (2.04) (8.57) (8.57)
+12 0.21 0.30 -5.46 -6.32 2.72 0.63 -6.14 -6.32
(1.56) (2.06) (7.35) (7.53) (3.06) (2.39) (7.29) (7.54)
Obs 456 456 110 110 438 438 110 110
EffObs 216 234 63 71 168 221 66 71
Time FE X X X X
Each row represents a separate regression and reports the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on the
logarithmic change in the outcome between time t− 1 and time t + h. OECD (1970) indicates the
group of countries that were OECD members in 1970 (Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany (West Germany pre-1989), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States). Non-OECD (1970) indicates all other countries. The Chile 1970 presidential
election, which had an extraordinarily large effect on stock market valuations (Girardi and Bowles,
2018), was excluded. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation (so a coefficient of 1
means a 1% increase in the variable). For each time-horizon considered, we estimate eq.1 through
kernel-weighted local linear regression (triangular kernel), using the bias-corrected procedure of
Calonico et al. (2014). Robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered by country in parenthesis.
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. The number of observations refers to the specification with
time-horizon h = 1.
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Table 9: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory (RD Estimates)
Robustness to alternative bandwidth selection criteria
h (months) MSE (CCT) MSE (IK) CER (CCT)
(common) (two) (common) (common) (two)
Share Prices
+1 −5.15∗∗ −5.05∗∗ −5.23∗∗ −5.30∗∗ −5.04∗∗
(2.44) (2.48) (2.62) (2.52) (2.56)
+3 -2.62 -2.89 -4.10 -3.04 -3.23
(3.10) (3.08) (3.21) (3.07) (3.08)
+6 -2.96 -3.50 -5.77 -3.87 -4.26
(4.75) (4.69) (4.92) (4.78) (4.71)
Domestic exchange rate
+1 −4.08∗ −3.92 ∗ ∗ −5.66∗∗∗ −5.11∗∗∗ −4.36∗∗
(1.80) (1.68) (2.15) (1.91) (1.80)
+3 −7.68∗∗∗ −5.95∗∗ −7.67∗∗∗ −7.81∗∗∗ −4.54∗∗
(2.83) (2.70) (2.93) (2.97) (2.22)
+6 -2.58 -2.77 -6.02 −6.30∗ -5.21
(3.49) (3.68) (3.68) (3.76) (3.98)
Government bond yields
+1 -0.89 −1.01∗ -0.65 −0.99∗ -0.94
(0.56) (0.59) (0.48) (0.58) (0.58)
+3 0.25 0.40 0.57 0.32 0.41
(0.90) (0.93) (0.96) (0.91) (0.92)
+6 0.63 0.59 2.50 0.80 0.75
(1.64) (1.60) (3.11) (1.75) (1.71)
Government bond spreads
+1 −1.04∗ −1.04∗ -0.70 −0.99∗ -0.91
(0.62) (0.62) (0.51) (0.60) (0.60)
+3 0.37 0.32 0.58 0.35 0.48
(0.96) (0.93) (0.99) (0.95) (0.93)
+6 0.89 0.81 2.55 1.07 1.03
(1.84) (1.81) (3.11) (1.98) (1.95)
Time FE X X X X X
Each row represents a separate regression and reports the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on the
logarithmic change in the outcome between time t− 1 and time t + h. Coefficients are multiplied by
100 for ease of interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the variable). For each
time-horizon considered, we estimate eq.1 through kernel-weighted local linear regressions (triangular
kernel), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014). Column titles indicate the
criterion used for selecting the bandwidth employed by the RD estimator. MSE (CCT) is the
MSE-optimal bandwidth selector using the procedure of Calonico et al. (2014); MSE (IK) is the
MSE-optimal bandwidth selector using the procedure of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012); CER
(CCT) is the CER-optimal bandwidth selector using the procedure of Calonico et al. (2014); ‘common’
means that a unique bandwidth size is used on both sides of the threshold; ‘two’ means that two
different bandwidth sizes are used (below and above the cutoff). Robust bias-corrected standard errors
clustered by country in parenthesis. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 10: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory (RD Estimates), excluding influential
observations
h (months) Stock market Exchange rate
+1 −3.83∗∗∗ −3.07∗∗ −2.71∗∗∗ −2.67∗∗
(1.29) (1.21) (1.01) (1.18)
Excl. obs. 26 24 5 7
+3 -2.97 -0.52 −7.60∗∗∗ -2.80
(2.37) (2.03) (2.53) (1.77)
Excl. obs. 24 21 3 5
+6 -1.55 -1.06 -0.98 -1.61
(3.79) (2.83) (2.59) (2.90)
Excl. obs. 26 28 3 3
Time FE X X
Each row represents a separate regression and reports the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on the
logarithmic change in the outcome between time t− 1 and time t + h. In each regression we exclude
the most influential observations, defined as those with |DFBeta| > 2/√N . The number of excluded
observations is indicated in the ‘Excl. obs.’ row. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of
interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the variable). For each time-horizon
considered, we estimate eq.1 through kernel-weighted local linear regression (triangular kernel), using
the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014). Robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered
by country in parenthesis. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
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Table 11: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory, using only elections for which all financial
variables are simultaneously available (RD Estimates; monthly data)
h (months) Stock market Exchange rate Gov’t bonds yield Gov’t bonds spread
+1 -5.40 -3.82 −10.26∗ −7.09∗ -0.34 -0.44 0.09 -0.44
(3.61) (2.88) (5.66) (4.11) (0.73) (0.56) (0.64) (0.56)
+3 -6.14 -9.54 -9.21 -5.76 -0.68 -0.45 -0.04 -0.45
(7.33) (7.52) (6.14) (4.65) (0.95) (0.67) (1.10) (0.67)
+6 -16.83 -11.84 -4.78 -1.73 -0.18 0.03 -0.15 0.03
(13.62) (8.14) (7.32) (5.25) (1.05) (0.72) (1.06) (0.72)
Obs 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147
Eff. obs 68 68 85 91 110 114 103 114
Time FE X X X X
Each row represents a separate regression and reports the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on the
logarithmic change in the outcome between time t− 1 and time t + h. We restrict the sample to those
elections for which all financial variables are available. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of
interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the variable). For each time-horizon
considered, we estimate eq.1 through kernel-weighted local linear regressions (triangular kernel), using
the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014). Robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered
by country in parenthesis. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. The number of observations refers to the
specification with time-horizon h = 1.
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Appendix A. List of countries and stock market indexes
Table A.1: List of countries, elections and stock market indexes
Ctry Elections Stock market index
All Parliam. Presid.
tot use tot. use tot. use
AGO 6 1 4 0 3 1 n.a.
ALB 8 4 8 4 0 0 n.a.
ARG 28 4 26 0 13 4 IVBNG (SCF pre-1966)
ARM 12 8 6 5 6 3 n.a.
AUS 27 27 27 27 0 0 ASX All-Ordinaries (w/GFD extension)
AUT 32 31 20 20 12 11 Wiener Boersekammer (WBKI)
AZE 12 1 5 1 7 0 n.a.
BEL 22 21 22 21 0 0 Brussels All-Share (w/GFD extension)
BGR 15 14 10 9 5 5 SOFIX
BIH 6 3 6 3 5 0 Sarajevo SE Bosnian Investment Funds
BLR 9 2 4 1 5 1 n.a.
BOL 13 4 9 0 7 4 n.a.
BRA 23 8 14 0 16 8 IBX-100 (IBV pre-1995)
CAN 23 23 23 23 0 0 S&P-TSX 300 CI (w/GFD extension)
CHE 18 17 18 17 0 0 CHE Price Index (w/GFD extension)
CHL 24 14 14 3 12 11 Santiago SE IGPA
CMR 15 1 7 0 9 1 n.a.
COL 37 9 22 0 17 9 IGBC GI (w/GFD extension)
CRI 19 10 17 0 17 10 Bolsa Nacional de Valores
CYP 14 11 7 4 7 7 CSE All Share CI
CZE 12 8 10 6 2 2 Prague SE PX
DEU 19 19 19 19 0 0 CDAX CI (w/GFD extension)
DNK 27 26 27 26 0 0 OMX Copenhagen All-Share
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Table A.1: List of countries, elections and stock market indexes
Ctry Elections Stock market index
All Parliam. Presid.
tot use tot. use tot. use
DOM 18 9 12 0 14 9 n.a.
DZA 11 2 6 0 5 2 n.a.
ECU 30 7 19 0 16 7 Guayaquil BV (Quito SE pre-1994)
ESP 13 13 13 13 0 0 Madrid SE GI (w/GFD extension)
EST 14 5 9 5 5 0 EVK CI (OECD MEI pre-1995 and post-1998)
FIN 31 28 20 19 11 9 OMX Helsinki All-Share
FRA 28 26 18 18 10 8 CAC All-Tradable (w/GFD extension)
GBR 19 19 19 19 0 0 FTSE All-Share (w/GFD extension)
GEO 14 7 8 3 7 4 n.a.
GHA 9 6 7 0 7 6 MSCI
GIN 11 4 4 0 7 4 n.a.
GMB 13 6 9 0 7 6 n.a.
GNB 12 1 5 0 8 1 n.a.
GRC 26 17 26 17 0 0 DJ (National Bank pre-1992)
GTM 30 3 18 0 18 3 n.a.
HND 11 6 11 0 11 6 n.a.
HRV 14 12 9 8 6 4 Bourse Index (CROBEX)
HTI 10 3 7 0 7 3 n.a.
HUN 15 9 10 7 5 2 BSE CETOP (OETEB pre-2002; OECD MEI pre-1995)
IRL 31 22 20 20 11 2 ISEQ Overall (w/GFD extension)
ISL 30 23 21 19 9 4 OMX Iceland All-Share
ISR 21 21 20 18 3 3 Tel Aviv All-Share
ITA 18 18 18 18 0 0 BCI Index (w/GFD extension)
JPN 26 22 26 22 0 0 Tokyo SE (TOPIX) (w/GFD extension)
KAZ 12 1 6 0 6 1 n.a.
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Table A.1: List of countries, elections and stock market indexes
Ctry Elections Stock market index
All Parliam. Presid.
tot use tot. use tot. use
KGZ 12 3 6 0 6 3 Kyrgyz SE
KHM 7 1 6 0 1 1 n.a.
KOR 23 7 10 4 13 3 KOSPI
LKA 23 10 15 5 8 5 Col. SE All-Shares (CIF pre-1984; Preference pre-1963)
LTU 12 9 6 5 6 4 IMF IFS index (Litin-G pre-2005)
LUX 15 13 15 13 0 0 LUXX (w/GFD extension)
LVA 8 8 8 8 0 0 OECD MEI (Riga SE DJ pre-2000)
MDA 14 7 8 6 6 1 n.a.
MDG 19 5 9 0 11 5 n.a.
MEX 20 19 20 13 8 6 MEX SE IPC
MKD 11 10 8 7 5 3 MBI-10
MLT 11 2 11 2 0 0 Malta SE Index
MNG 17 5 10 0 7 5 MNG SE Top-20
MOZ 7 2 7 0 5 3 n.a.
MWI 9 1 9 0 5 1 n.a.
NAM 6 1 6 0 5 2 NAM SE Overall
NGA 12 3 10 0 8 3 NGA SE
NIC 7 5 6 0 7 5 n.a.
NLD 21 21 21 21 0 0 NLD All-Share (w/GFD extension)
NOR 17 17 17 17 0 0 Oslo SE OBX-25 (w/GFD extension)
NZL 24 24 24 24 0 0 NZL SE All-Share
PAN 13 2 13 0 12 2 Panama SE BVPSI
PER 18 6 12 0 13 6 Lima S&P-BVL GI (w/GFD extension)
PHL 19 2 17 0 12 2 Manila SE CI
POL 18 9 12 7 6 2 Warsaw SE 20-Share CI (OECD MEI pre-1994)
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Table A.1: List of countries, elections and stock market indexes
Ctry Elections Stock market index
All Parliam. Presid.
tot use tot. use tot. use
PRT 24 23 15 14 9 9 Oporto PSI-20
PRY 10 3 9 0 10 3 Asuncion SE PDV GI
ROU 15 10 10 7 7 3 Bucharest SE
RUS 11 6 6 6 5 0 MICEX (AK&M pre-1997)
RWA 8 1 5 0 5 1 n.a.
SDN 13 1 10 0 8 1 n.a.
SEN 16 1 12 0 8 1 n.a.
SLE 13 3 9 0 7 3 n.a.
SLV 22 4 12 0 11 4 El Salvador Stock Market Index
SRB 14 10 9 6 7 4 BELEX-15 (from IMF IFS)
SVK 13 8 9 6 4 2 Bratislava SE SAX
SVN 13 8 8 6 6 2 SVN SE SBITOP Blue Chip
SWE 21 21 21 21 0 0 OMX Stockholm All-Share
SYC 9 2 3 0 8 2 n.a.
SYR 17 7 9 0 8 7 n.a.
TJK 10 3 5 0 5 3 n.a.
TUN 11 3 8 0 8 3 n.a.
TUR 18 18 18 18 0 0 Istanbul SE IMKB-100
TZA 12 8 9 0 10 8 Dar-Es-Saleem SE
UGA 9 4 7 0 4 4 UGA SE All-Share Index
UKR 12 7 7 5 5 2 PFTS OTC Index
URY 17 11 14 0 14 11 Bolsa de Valores Montevideo (URY SE pre-2008)
USA 36 18 35 0 18 18 S&P 500 CI (w/GFD extension)
UZB 10 2 6 0 4 2 n.a.
VEN 18 12 13 0 14 12 Caracas SE GI (w/GFD extension)
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Table A.1: List of countries, elections and stock market indexes
Ctry Elections Stock market index
All Parliam. Presid.
tot use tot. use tot. use
ZAF 10 5 10 5 0 0 FTSE/JSE All-Share (w/GFD extension)
ZMB 11 7 8 0 11 7 Lusaka All-Share (LASI)
ZWE 13 2 10 0 5 2 n.a.
For elections, ‘tot’ is the total number of elections that we have information about; ‘use’
is the number of elections for which we could calculate the ‘Left margin’ variable and
data is available for at least one of our financial outcomes of interest (so they are used
in estimation for at least one outcome of interest). Countries for which we have election
data but no election is used in estimation (because we could not calculate the ‘Left
margin’ or data is not available for any financial outcome) are not included.
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Appendix B. Graphs using abnormal returns
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Figure B.1: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory on financial markets (abnormal returns)
(Dynamic regression-discontinuity estimates; monthly data)
The graph displays the effect of a left-victory on the outcomes of interest in a time-window including 6 months
before the election and 12 months after. Estimated through the dynamic regression-discontinuity specification of
eq. 1, with h varying from -6 to +12 months. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation (so a
coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the variable). For each time-horizon considered, we estimate eq.1
through kernel-weighted local linear regression (triangular kernel), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico
et al. (2014). Dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals from robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered by
country. Time-effects previously filtered-out through a regression of the outcome on month-year dummies.
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Figure B.2: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory on stock market abnormal returns
(Dynamic regression-discontinuity estimates; daily data)
The graph displays the effect of a left-victory on the outcomes of interest in a time-window including 20
days before the election and 30 trading days after. Estimated through the dynamic
regression-discontinuity specification of eq. 1, with h varying from -20 to +30 trading days. Coefficients
are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation (so a coefficient of 1 means a 1% increase in the
variable). For each time-horizon considered, we estimate eq.1 through kernel-weighted local linear
regression (triangular kernel), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014). Dashed lines
are 95% confidence intervals from robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered by country.
Time-effects previously filtered-out through a regression of the outcome on month-year dummies.
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Figure B.3: Effect of a left-wing electoral victory on financial markets – abnormal returns
(Regression-discontinuity estimates; monthly data)
The vertical axis displays the percentage change in the outcome between time t− 1 and time t + 1,
where t is the election month. Time-effects previously filtered-out through a regression of the outcome
on month-year dummies. The horizontal axis displays the Left’s margin of victory: the margin of the
left-wing candidate in presidential systems; the left share of parliamentary seats minus 50% in
legislative systems. Fitted lines are estimated semi-parametrically through kernel-weighted local linear
regression, with mean squared error-optimal bandwidth. The graphs correspond to eq. 1, with h = 1.
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Figure B.4: Falsification test with placebo thresholds – Abnormal Returns
(vertical red dotted line = estimate from true threshold)
The figure reports the empirical distribution of t-statistics from our regression discontinuity estimate of
the treatment effect (eq. 6, with h=1), based on 200 randomly drawn placebo thresholds. Placebo
thresholds were drawn separately on the left and on the right side of the true threshold (100 on each
side), using only observations belonging to that side, to avoid mis-specification arising from assuming
continuity at the true threshold. In each graph, the vertical red dotted line represents the t-statistics
obtained from using the true threshold. The t-stats are obtained from robust bias-corrected standard
errors (Calonico et al., 2014) clustered by country. Time-effects previously filtered-out through a
regression of the outcome on month-year dummies.
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